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INTRODUCTION
A vehicle on a public thoroughfare is observed driving erratically
and careening across the roadway. After the vehicle strikes another passenger car and comes to a stop, the responding officer notices in the driver the telltale symptoms of intoxication—bloodshot eyes, slurred speech,
and a distinct odor of intoxicants. On these facts, a lawfully-procured
warrant authorizing the extraction of the driver’s blood is obtained.
However, the document fails to circumscribe the manner and variety of
testing that may be performed on the sample. Does this lack of particularity render the warrant constitutionally infirm as a mandate for chemical analysis of the blood? And, more broadly speaking, is there reason to
∗
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posit that testing of the blood is a distinct Fourth Amendment event relative to its initial procurement?
This Note—against prevailing trends in national search and seizure
jurisprudence—answers both of the preceding questions in the affirmative. In reaching these conclusions, I explore a novel “testing-as-search”
paradigm that rebuts longstanding presumptions in Fourth Amendment
case law. In essence, I use this analytical template to argue that DUI defendants (among others) retain a reasonable, ongoing privacy interest in
their blood once it has been extracted as evidence in a prosecution. As a
necessary corollary to this thesis, I also submit that police should not exploit chemical analysis of a defendant’s blood in the absence of a warrant
narrowly tailoring the scope of testing that may be performed.
This work proceeds in several parts. Part I begins with a cursory recital of the Supreme Court’s search and seizure jurisprudence, elucidating familiar principles of Fourth Amendment law. Part II then proceeds
to examine the Court’s case law as it relates to the procurement and
analysis of biological samples, such as blood, via search warrant. Part III
surveys federal and state decisions that offer competing perspectives on
what law enforcement officials are entitled to do with blood samples
once they have been lawfully extracted. Part IV provides an overview of
Washington State’s Martines decision. Part V introduces the testing-assearch paradigm to contend that, given the sui generis nature of blood,
legitimate privacy interests are being compromised under a construct of
the Fourth Amendment that fails to distinguish between biological and
nonbiological evidence. Accordingly, it contemplates certain remedial
measures in the issuance of search warrants intended to curb the limitless
and unaccountable testing of biological evidence. Finally, Part VI briefly
touches upon the phenomenon of DNA databanks to illustrate the stakes
associated with continued adherence to an approach that gives law enforcement unjustified latitude in analyzing a defendant’s blood.
I. BASIC TENETS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
It is well settled that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are generally regarded as per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.1 Of course,
a defendant can only invoke this protection when legitimate privacy interests are imperiled. As Justice Harlan observed in his oft-cited concurrence in Katz v. United States, the Fourth Amendment circumscribes a
state’s conduct only when an individual meets a “twofold requirement”:
first, the defendant must “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of
1. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971).
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privacy,” and secondly, that “expectation [must] be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”2 Perhaps the most explicit guidance in Katz as to the reasonableness of a privacy expectation was the
pronouncement that “what a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”3 This basic two-dimensional inquiry provides the essential
constitutional paradigm through which most Fourth Amendment challenges are construed.
Once a defendant prevails under the Katz threshold, other constitutional principles dictate the manner in which a search warrant must be
composed in order to pass muster. The Supreme Court has observed that
“indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of
‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the framing
and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”4 General warrants “do not
specify the place or sphere of a search, thereby granting unrestricted discretion to executing officers”;5 as such, they are categorically prohibited
under the Constitution.6 The problem posed by the general warrant is not
precisely interpreted as merely one of intrusion, but “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings” that the framers sought to
guard against.7 The Fourth Amendment addresses this problem by requiring a particular description of the things to be seized.8 This crucial element of each warrant “makes general searches . . . impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to
what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.”9
II. GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT ON TESTING OF BLOOD
SAMPLES
Within the particularized realm of criminal prosecutions involving
the withdrawal of blood from a defendant’s person, the Supreme Court
has “long recognized that a ‘compelled intrusio[n] into the body for
blood to be analyzed for alcohol content’ must be deemed a Fourth
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 351.
4. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980).
5. The Honorable M. Blane Michael, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Madison Lecture: Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief that Gave It Birth
(Oct. 20, 2009), in 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 925 (2010).
6. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
7. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S.
192, 196 (1927)).
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Amendment search.”10 However, not only is the case law substantiating
this tradition relatively sparse, but there is even less authority from which
to infer the Court’s willingness to treat the chemical analysis of blood as
a distinct Fourth Amendment event.
The seminal decision for purposes of this discussion is Schmerber
v. California.11 In Schmerber, the Court reasoned that because “[s]earch
warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings,” a less stringent requirement would be implausible “where intrusions into the human
body are concerned.”12 Moreover, the Court stressed that the importance
of requiring authorization by a neutral and detached magistrate before a
law enforcement officer can “invade another’s body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great.”13
The Court in Schmerber nonetheless proceeded to uphold the constitutionality of a blood draw from a DUI defendant under circumstances
where the law enforcement officer had failed to secure a warrant beforehand.14 It did so by justifying the extraction on a well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement: the officer had
been confronted with an emergency that threatened the destruction of
evidence, since “the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops.”15 Still, the Court emphasized that the
ultimate constitutionality of such warrantless blood draws depends equally on whether the test chosen to measure blood alcohol content is a reasonable one and whether that test is performed in a reasonable manner.16
Given these latter caveats, there is concededly some merit to the argument that, under Schmerber, any chemical analysis of blood need be
“reasonable,” irrespective of whether a warrant authorizing specific testing has been procured or not.17 However, such a conclusion is by no
means irrefutable given that the defendant in Schmerber did not attempt
to distinguish the extraction of his blood from its subsequent testing; he

10. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68 (1966)).
11. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
12. Id. at 770.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 758, 772.
15. Id. at 770; see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (“[T]he need ‘to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence’ has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for
a warrantless search.”).
16. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
17. Assuming that analysis of the blood does indeed qualify as a search to begin with, technicians could not, for instance, screen a sample for sexually transmitted diseases in a DUI investigation. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 388 (2009) (“[T]he reasonableness
of a search’s scope depends . . . on whether it is limited to the area that is capable of concealing the
object of the search.”). For commentary on this reasonableness standard, see infra Part III.
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challenged only the constitutionality of the former.18 Accordingly, there
was no justiciable basis on which to reach the question of blood testing
as a discrete Fourth Amendment event.19
The Court seemingly clarified its interpretation of the relationship
between the extraction of biological samples and their subsequent analysis in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n.20 Skinner concerned
the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) of 1970, which “authorize[d]
the Secretary of Transportation to ‘prescribe, as necessary, appropriate
rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad safety.’”21 Pursuant to the statute, the Federal Railroad Administration promulgated regulations that mandated the blood and urine analysis of railroad
employees involved in certain accidents.22 The issue presented was
“whether these regulations violate[d] the Fourth Amendment.”23
Before reaching the merits of the case, however, the Court offered a
primer on what it perceived to be uncontested Fourth Amendment law:
We have long recognized that a “compelled intrusio[n] into the
body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content” must be deemed
a Fourth Amendment search. In light of our society’s concern for
the security of one’s person, it is obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing
chemical analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a
further invasion of the tested employee’s privacy interests.24

Interestingly, a number of scholars have taken Skinner at its word
and accepted a literal interpretation of the “further invasion” language as
set forth in the opinion.25 This would seem to counsel in favor of requiring a separate warrant for testing in order to safeguard the privacy interests at stake in the continued intrusion. Viewed in context, however, the
18. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766.
19. Id. at 771.
20. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
21. Id. at 606; see also 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1970) (repealed 1994).
22. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 616 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
25. See, e.g., Leigh M. Harlan, Note, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to
Mandate the Destruction of DNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 192 (2004) (“[The Supreme Court] has
expressly recognized that the initial procurement of a biological sample and the subsequent analysis
of the sample are two conceptually distinct events necessitating independent Fourth Amendment
analyses.”); Natalie Logan, Note, Questions of Time, Place, and Mo(o)re: Personal Property Rights
and Continued Seizure Under the DNA Act, 92 B.U. L. REV. 733, 739–40 (2012) (“Collection of [a
biological] sample . . . constitutes a seizure of the person’s tissue and accompanying ‘DNA fingerprint.’ Once collected, the analysis of the sample constitutes a second, independent search of the
seized sample.”).

200

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 39:195

Court in Skinner did not strictly apply this principle to the legal issue
under consideration—namely, whether the FRSA’s regulations directly
contravened the Fourth Amendment.26 Rather, given the safety concerns
associated with rail travel, it resolved the case under the superseding
“special needs” exception to the warrant requirement.27 As in Schmerber,
the Skinner Court came nowhere close to adjudicating whether the testing of a blood sample is a distinct Fourth Amendment event relative to
its initial lawful procurement, rendering the “further invasion” language
dicta.
Another remark from the Court without the force of precedent has
spoken more directly to the significance of biological testing. Ferguson
v. City of Charleston concerned a state hospital’s testing of urine samples
of pregnant women suspected of drug abuse where those patients had
consented to providing such samples as a condition to receiving obstetric
care.28 The Court ultimately invalidated the hospital’s policy as a surreptitious prosecutorial scheme rather than a valid exercise of the “special
needs” exception to the warrant requirement.29 However, Justice Scalia
dissented to emphasize the importance of the patients’ consent in providing the urine samples:
There is only one act that could conceivably be regarded as a search
of petitioners in the present case: the taking of the urine sample. . . .
Some would argue, I suppose, that testing of the urine is prohibited
by some generalized privacy right “emanating” from the “penumbras” of the Constitution (a question that is not before us); but it is
not even arguable that the testing of urine that has been lawfully
obtained [through consent] is a Fourth Amendment search.30

Justice Scalia’s dissent in Ferguson suggests that the more conservative members of the Court are unlikely to be receptive to attempts at
dissociating the analysis of a biological sample from its initial extraction
by lawful warrant or consent. Decisions such as Schmerber and Skinner,
meanwhile, are comparatively less instructive in gleaning the Court’s
potential treatment of the issue under the Fourth Amendment. But, as the
discussion below illustrates, the lower federal and state courts have not
waited for the Supreme Court to render a decisive opinion before reaching a consensus that a state can lawfully exploit testing of a blood sample
in its possession without secondary judicial authorization.
26. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
27. Id. at 633. For a recent articulation of the “special needs” doctrine, see Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011).
28. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70–74 (2001).
29. Id. at 85–86.
30. Id. at 92–93 (emphasis in second sentence added).
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III. TRENDS IN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
Despite the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in resolving the
Fourth Amendment significance of chemical analysis of a biological
sample, national search and seizure jurisprudence is largely in agreement: No express judicial authorization is needed to analyze a suspect’s
blood (or any other biological sample) once it has already been lawfully
procured.31
United States v. Snyder represents a prototypical application of this
principle by the Ninth Circuit.32 In Snyder, the defendant’s blood was
drawn without his consent at the scene of an automobile accident after
the attending officers suspected he was intoxicated.33 A blood test performed two days later revealed that his blood alcohol level was over the
legal limit.34 Appealing his DUI conviction, Snyder acknowledged that
the blood draw at the scene had been constitutionally permissible under
Schmerber but “challenge[d] the subsequent warrantless analysis of the
[blood] sample as an unreasonable search.”35
The court found this argument unavailing. “The flaw in Snyder’s
argument,” it reasoned, was his “attempt to divide his arrest, and the subsequent extraction and testing of his blood, into too many separate incidents, each to be given independent significance for [F]ourth
[A]mendment purposes.”36 In the court’s view, “Schmerber viewed the
seizure and separate search of the blood as a single event.”37 Accordingly, under well-settled Supreme Court precedent, it was able to conclude
that the “performance of a blood-alcohol test has no independent significance for [F]ourth [A]mendment purposes.”38
As discussed in the preceding section, Schmerber’s treatment of the
issue in Snyder was effectively nonexistent due to the fact that the defendant in that case did not challenge the constitutionality of the state’s
blood analysis. Therefore, any extension of Schmerber in this respect
rests on tenuous grounds. Given the lack of a search warrant for the defendant’s blood in either case, neither Schmerber nor Snyder are instruc-

31. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 4.10(e) (5th ed. 2013) (“[I]t is generally understood that a lawful seizure of apparent evidence of
crime pursuant to a search warrant carries with it a right to test or otherwise examine the seized
materials to ascertain or enhance their evidentiary value . . . .”).
32. United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1988).
33. Id. at 472.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 473.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 474.
38. Id.
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tive in terms of what should be expected of a magistrate who authorizes
the procurement of such a sample.
Nonetheless, several state decisions have unequivocally advanced
the reasoning adopted in Snyder for the proposition that a defendant’s
privacy interests in his or her blood do not survive past the point of initial
extraction by law enforcement. For example, in People v. King, a New
York court offered the following interpretation of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence with regard to the testing of biological samples:
It is . . . clear that once a person’s blood sample has been obtained
lawfully, he can no longer assert either privacy claims or unreasonable search and seizure arguments with respect to the use of that
sample. Privacy concerns are no longer relevant once the sample
has already lawfully been removed from the body, and the scientific
analysis of a sample does not involve any further search and seizure
of a defendant’s person.39

Similarly, in State v. Hauge, the Supreme Court of Hawaii looked to nationwide trends in search and seizure cases to reach an identical conclusion about any privacy interests the defendant may have retained in the
biological sample seized by law enforcement in the case at bar:
Our review of the case law of other jurisdictions indicates that
the appellate courts of several states have ruled that expectations
of privacy in lawfully obtained blood samples . . . are not objectively reasonable by “society’s” standards. Specifically, a number of jurisdictions have held on analogous facts that once a
blood sample and DNA profile is lawfully procured from a defendant, no privacy interest persists in either the sample or the
profile.40
While the conclusions reached in King and Hauge are certainly representative of prevailing state approaches, some decisions have made minimal inroads in articulating limitations on a state’s ability to conduct testing of a biological sample in its possession.
State v. Sanders, an unpublished case from Wisconsin, is such an
example.41 In Sanders, police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s blood after his involvement in a serious automobile collision.42 The
warrant “[did] not limit—or even address—what the police could or
could not do with the blood once it was drawn.”43 Although there was
39. People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
40. State v. Hauge, 79 P.3d 131, 144 (Haw. 2003).
41. State v. Sanders, Nos. 93-2284-CR & 93-2286-CR, 1994 WL 481723 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept.
8, 1994).
42. Id. at *1.
43. Id. at *5.
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merely probable cause to suspect that Sanders had been under the influence of alcohol at the time of the collision, his blood was tested for the
presence of tetrahydrocannabinols (THC) in addition to being analyzed
for its alcohol content.44 The results indicated an illegal degree of intoxication on both counts.45
Sanders argued on appeal that “testing his blood for the presence of
drugs, as opposed to alcohol alone, exceeded the scope of the search warrant and thus was itself an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment.”46
Sanders’s position relied primarily on the “further invasion” language
from Skinner.47 However, the court found Skinner unpersuasive for many
of the same reasons voiced earlier—the opinion’s reference to a “further
invasion” is, at best, dicta in a “special needs” exception case that was
resolved on different principles.48 Instead, the court maintained that
“once the police came into lawful possession of the blood samples,
Sanders lost any expectation of privacy he may have had in them, at least
insofar as testing for intoxicants . . . [was] concerned.”49
The court also felt compelled to respond to Sanders’s contention
that the rule being adopted “open[ed] the door to allow testing of blood
for any purpose the state might elect to pursue.”50 In rebuttal, the court
stated that “the ‘reasonableness standard’ of the Fourth Amendment
would protect against the significant, but unnecessary, invasion of a defendant’s privacy interests that subjecting his blood to unrestricted testing for every fact that it could possibly reveal would entail.”51
However, there is a troubling obstacle to the endorsement of such a
reasonableness standard—by its terms, it delegates to the state the task of
policing itself when it comes to the testing of blood and other biological
samples. Dispensing with the warrant requirement plainly means that
there is no initial opportunity for a neutral magistrate to evaluate the necessity of the state’s testing; as such, testing of the sample only stands to
be deemed unreasonable by a court after the fact (i.e., after the defendant
may have been adversely impacted within the criminal justice system).52

44. Id. at *1–2.
45. Id. at *2.
46. Id. at *3.
47. Id. at *4; see supra Part II.
48. Sanders, 1994 WL 481723, at *5.
49. Id.
50. Id. at *5 n.5 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Id.
52. Such consequences are not difficult to imagine: a defendant’s name and reputation may be
tarnished by the mere fact of an indictment alone, even where the charge is later dismissed because
of Fourth Amendment violations. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950)
(“The impact of an indictment is on the reputation or liberty of a man. The same is true where a
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The Supreme Court has previously stressed that even when law enforcement officials take it upon themselves to ensure the “reasonableness” of
their search without first deferring to a magistrate, there is nonetheless
little chance of the officers conducting a search that comports with the
Fourth Amendment, absent certain exceptions.
In Katz,53 the Government urged that “because [its agents] did no
more . . . than they might properly have done with prior judicial sanction,” their warrantless search of the defendant should be “retroactively
validate[d].”54 Yet the court was unambiguous in proclaiming that it had
“never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably
expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined
their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end.”55
Accordingly, there is little doubt that self-imposed restraints on state
conduct are inimical with the protections contemplated by the Fourth
Amendment.
Other decisions have treaded a slightly different path in announcing
that it is only the noncontraband contents of blood that an individual can
assert a legitimate privacy interest in after its lawful extraction. For instance, in State v. Price, police sought and obtained a warrant for the defendant’s blood after his involvement in a fatal car crash.56 Although the
accompanying affidavit to the warrant only contemplated analyzing
Price’s blood alcohol content, the warrant itself “did not specify what
tests could be conducted.”57 The tests results came back positive for the
presence of THC.58
Like the defendant in Sanders, Price challenged the testing of his
blood for THC as “outside the scope of the warrant.”59 However, the
court relied on Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate.60 As such,
the court was bound to hold that “once a blood sample has been legitimately seized, the individual from whom that sample was taken has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contraband contents of his
blood.”61 Although the court conceded that testing Price’s blood, by conprosecutor files an information charging violations of the law. The harm to property and business
can . . . be incalculable by the mere institution of proceedings.”).
53. See supra text accompanying note 2.
54. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967).
55. Id. at 356–57 (emphasis added).
56. State v. Price, 270 P.3d 527, 529 (Utah 2012).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 529–30.
60. Id. at 530 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)); see infra text accompanying notes 70–71.
61. Id.
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trast, for “HIV status, DNA information, blood type, or other private
medical facts . . . would have infringed upon a legitimate privacy interest,” it noted conclusively that this did not happen in the present matter.62
Similarly, in State v. Loveland, the defendant was searched after being detained for fleeing an officer, and marijuana was discovered on his
person.63 After booking Loveland into a detention center, officers procured a urine sample without his consent.64 The sample tested positive
for both marijuana and cocaine, which officers ostensibly could not have
suspected would be found.65 Loveland subsequently argued that the test
for cocaine was an unreasonable search and seizure because it was unsubstantiated by probable cause.66
The court remarked, “While the State urges us to find that Loveland
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the sample generally, we
restrain ourselves to a more limited holding.”67 As in Price, the court
ultimately resorted to articulating the principle that possession of contraband is irreconcilable with the sort of legitimate privacy interests safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment.68 In Loveland’s case, that rule dictated that “testing to determine whether [his urine] contained traces of cocaine compromise[d] no legitimate privacy interest.”69
Though the noncontraband approach adopted in Price and Loveland
appears to make an important concession towards defendants’ privacy
rights, it is ultimately as unavailing as the reasonableness standard endorsed in Sanders. To expose the fundamental infirmity in this argument,
however, it is first necessary to consult the Supreme Court precedent being invoked as authority for a Fourth Amendment exception.
Both Price and Loveland rested heavily on Illinois v. Caballes in
declaring that the defendants could not maintain a legitimate privacy interest in the contraband contents of their blood.70 Caballes was concerned with neither search warrants nor blood testing, but a challenge to
the constitutionality of drug sniffs conducted outside the exteriors of vehicles pulled over for reasons unrelated to narcotics interdiction.71 Reject62. Id.
63. State v. Loveland, 696 N.W.2d 164, 164 (S.D. 2005).
64. Id. The record is unclear as to the exact procedure by which the sample was obtained; there
is no mention in the case of a search warrant.
65. Id. at 165.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 167.
70. See State v. Price, 270 P.3d 527, 530 (Utah 2012) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
408 (2005)); Loveland, 696 N.W.2d at 166–67 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09
(2005)).
71. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
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ing defendant Caballes’s argument that probable cause related to his possession of marijuana was needed to authorize a dog sniff after his vehicle
had been detained, the Court stated:
We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be
deemed “legitimate,” and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband “compromises no legitimate privacy interest.” This is because the expectation “that certain facts
will not come to the attention of the authorities” is not the same as
an interest in “privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.”72

At first blush, transposing the logic of Caballes into blood testing
cases appears eminently reasonable. After all, is it not the case that a defendant can “possess” contraband—such as illegal narcotics—in his
bloodstream? The answer, as it turns out, is less clear than initial presumptions might suggest.
The conventional legal understanding of “possession” is not always
amenable to being applied in contexts where an individual has narcotics
in his system.73 While precise statutory definitions may differ from state
to state, one North Carolina appellate court surveying the case law concluded that, in most jurisdictions, “a positive drug test alone cannot support a conviction for possession.”74 A significant number of precedents
bear out that conclusion, with fairly consistent justifications among
them.75
Traditionally, legal “possession” requires an individual’s control
and knowledge of the property in question.76 In State v. Flinchpaugh, the
Kansas Supreme Court adeptly explained why both of these elements are
lacking for possession purposes when narcotics are in a defendant’s

72. Id. at 408–09 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122–23
(1984).
73. One dictionary definition of “possession” explains that it is “the right under which one may
exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others; the continuing exercise of a claim to
the exclusive use of a material object.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1351 (10th ed. 2014).
74. State v. Harris, 632 S.E.2d 534, 536 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
75. See, e.g., State v. Thronsen, 809 P.2d 941, 943 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (positive drug test
could not sustain conviction for cocaine possession because defendant ceased having control of it
once it entered his body); People v. Spann, 232 Cal. Rptr. 31, 33–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (crimes of
“use” and “possession” should not be merged); State v. Vorm, 570 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991) (positive drug test alone fails to prove defendant knowingly and voluntarily possessed cocaine); State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208, 211 (Kan. 1983) (once drug is in a person’s blood, he no
longer controls it, and positive drug test alone is insufficient to establish knowledge because it could
have been ingested involuntarily or by trick); State v. Lewis, 394 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (“[E]vidence of a controlled substance in a person’s urine specimen does not establish possession . . . absent probative corroborating evidence of actual physical possession.”).
76. State v. Farris, 125 S.W.3d 382, 394 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
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bloodstream.77 With regard to control, the court reasoned that once a drug
has been assimilated into the body, “the power of [a] person to control,
possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at an end.”78 Simply put, “[t]he
ability to control the drug is beyond human capabilities.”79 As for
knowledge of the presence of a drug, the court stated that it would be
untenable to ever infer that the drug had been willfully consumed—
rather, it “might have been injected involuntarily, or introduced by artifice, into the defendant’s system.”80
As Flinchpaugh illustrates, imputing possession to an individual
who has narcotics in his bloodstream is fraught with obstacles.81 This
makes Price and Loveland’s reliance on Caballes particularly unconvincing. In Caballes, the defendant obviously “possessed” the marijuana that
officers discovered as a result of the drug sniff; it was in the trunk of his
car and thus easily susceptible to being moved or transported at his discretion.82 Not so with the defendants in Price and Loveland, who had no
way to manipulate the drugs in their systems. Nor could knowledge of
the drugs be attributed to them absent corroborating evidence that they
had purposefully ingested the narcotics. In the final analysis, there is insufficient symmetry between Caballes and the Fourth Amendment issues
presented in blood analysis cases for a reviewing court to find the juxtaposition instructive.
IV. WASHINGTON’S MARTINES DECISION
Against the preceding backdrop of cases stands State v. Martines, a
Washington Court of Appeals decision that—prior to its review by the
state supreme court—was a jurisprudential anomaly in the realm of
Fourth Amendment case law.83
In Martines, state patrol officers obtained a warrant for the defendant’s blood after taking him into custody on suspicion of drunk driving.84
The warrant failed to make any mention of the testing that the State intended to perform on the sample.85 The test results indicated that
Martines’s blood alcohol level was significantly above the legal limit;
however, beyond this preliminary finding that had been the subject of the
77. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d at 213.
78. Id. at 211.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 212.
81. See id. at 213.
82. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005).
83. State v. Martines, 331 P.3d 105 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, No. 90926-1, 2015 WL
5076693 (Wash. Aug. 27, 2015).
84. Id. at 107.
85. Id.
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affidavit for probable cause, Martines’s blood was also tested for narcotics, which revealed the presence of Valium.86
Martines maintained on appeal that because the warrant authorizing
the extraction of his blood failed to explicitly authorize its subsequent
testing, “the results should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal
search.”87 The State responded that blood is “a thing to be seized, not a
place to be searched,” and once a blood sample is lawfully seized, the
individual whose blood has been seized no longer has a constitutionally
protected privacy interest in it.88
The Martines court disagreed with the State, holding that “the testing of blood intrudes upon a privacy interest that is distinct from the privacy interests in bodily integrity and personal security that are invaded
by a physical penetration of the skin.”89 Interestingly, the court relied
heavily on Skinner90 to discern that “the testing of the blood constitutes a
second search.”91 As such, a separate warrant thereafter became required
for chemical analysis in Washington.92 The court also contemplated
whether Martines had “knowingly exposed” the valuable information
contained in his blood, stating: “Blood is not like a voice or a face or
handwriting or fingerprints . . . . The personal information contained in
blood is hidden and highly sensitive. Testing . . . can reveal not only evidence of intoxication, but also evidence of disease, pregnancy, and genetic family relationships.”93
However, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, disregarding
Skinner entirely and applying a “commonsense reading” to the warrant to
hold that the document “authorized not merely the drawing and storing
of a blood sample but also the toxicology tests performed to detect the
presence of drugs or alcohol.”94 With comparatively little analysis, the
court concluded that because “[t]he purpose of the warrant was to draw a
sample of blood from Martines to obtain evidence of DUI,” it would not
be “sensible to read the warrant in a way that stops short of obtaining that
evidence.”95 Perhaps most importantly, the court did opine that testing of
86. Id. Valium is not considered “contraband” since it can be obtained by prescription. Accordingly, the facts in Martines did not provide an opportunity for the court to adopt the noncontraband
approach discussed in Price and Loveland.
87. Id. at 107.
88. Id. at 108.
89. Id. at 111.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 20–24.
91. Martines, 331 P.3d at 110.
92. Id. at 111.
93. Id. The court stated that “one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s voice,
fingerprints, handwriting, or facial characteristics.” Id. at 110–11.
94. State v. Martines, No. 90926-1, 2015 WL 5076693, at *5 (Wash. Aug. 27, 2015).
95. Id.
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a defendant’s blood does have to be “confined to the finding of probable
cause,” although it offered no direct authority for that proposition.96
While the Court of Appeals’s willingness to treat the testing of
blood as a distinct Fourth Amendment event in Martines is commendable, its express reliance on Skinner as irrefutable authority supporting the
testing-as-search paradigm is questionable.97 In the ensuing sections, I
depart from adherence to the Court of Appeals’s reasoning in order to
take up several justifications for why Martines’s reversal by the Washington Supreme Court will work substantial prejudice to the Fourth
Amendment rights of accused citizens. I consider not only why the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against general warrants supports a
biological/nonbiological distinction with regard to items to be seized by
warrant, but also specific privacy concerns associated with state DNA
databases.
V. A NEW PARADIGM FOR TESTING OF BLOOD SAMPLES UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
In arguing that the testing of a lawfully-procured blood sample constitutes a distinct Fourth Amendment event, it is first necessary to revisit
the two-pronged Katz test elaborated in Part I. As the Supreme Court
established in Katz, Fourth Amendment concerns are only implicated
when an individual displays a subjective expectation of privacy, and that
expectation is one that society is readily prepared to accept as “reasonable.”98
Under this inquiry, it is perhaps self-evident that the primary point
of contention in most challenges to a search or seizure will inhere in the
determination of whether the asserted privacy interest is congruous with
societal norms. On the one hand, it is plausible to contend that an individual’s privacy interests are significantly diminished when his person or
property is legitimately seized by law enforcement.99 On the other hand,
the Supreme Court has also acknowledged the countervailing concern
that “chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of
private medical facts about an [individual], including whether he or she
is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic”—facts that may be extraneous to any
criminal investigative aims.100 This latter concern is of paramount importance because, as one scholar has observed, “a person has no reason
96. Id.
97. See supra Part II.
98. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
99. This is the stance adopted by the court in People v. King, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610, 614 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997), and excerpted supra Part III.
100. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
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to know much of the information that will be revealed when [a biological
sample containing DNA] is analyzed. [She] has little to no discretion
over what information is stored in her body and likely has
not . . . evaluated that information herself.”101 Thus, it appears reasonable
under Katz to conclude that society is prepared to recognize at least some
privacy expectations in a biological sample retained by law enforcement
officials—not least because biological material should plainly be regarded as sui generis within the greater taxonomy of evidence. Under that
analysis, it necessarily follows that the testing of a biological sample is a
discrete Fourth Amendment search.
Many dismissals of the testing-as-search paradigm have been predicated on the notion that a biological sample should be treated as any other type of evidence for the purposes of constitutional analysis.102 In other
words, this approach construes “evidence” in a monolithic sense that
serves as an indiscriminate shelter for anything gathered pursuant to a
warrant over the course of a criminal investigation. Consider, for example, the approach embraced by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in the
following case.
In State v. VanLaarhoven, the defendant submitted the familiar argument that “his blood sample, once obtained, [could not] be analyzed
for evidentiary purposes without obtaining a second search warrant.”103
Rebutting the merits of VanLaarhoven’s claim, the court looked to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Petrone as guiding precedent.104 Petrone concerned a suppression challenge to photographs developed by law enforcement after the 35mm negatives had been seized
pursuant to a warrant.105 The thrust of Petrone’s Fourth Amendment argument was that “the process of developing the films [went] beyond the
authority of the warrant.”106 Holding that officers did not need a separate
warrant to develop the film, the court suggested that officials “simply
used technological aids to assist them in determining whether items within the scope of the warrant were in fact evidence of the crime alleged.”107
Surely, the court went on, Petrone “could not have objected had the deputies used a magnifying glass to examine lawfully seized documents or
101. Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the Fourth Amendment When DNA Collected for One Purpose is Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289, 1311 (2011).
102. See, e.g., King, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 118 (“Although human blood, with its unique genetic
properties, may initially be qualitatively different from [evidence such as a gun or controlled substance], once constitutional concerns have been satisfied, a blood sample is not unlike other tangible
property which can be subject to a battery of scientific tests.”).
103. State v. VanLaarhoven, 637 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
104. Id. at 416 (citing State v. Petrone, 468 N.W.2d 676 (Wis. 1991)).
105. State v. Petrone, 468 N.W.2d 676, 678–79 (Wis. 1991).
106. Id. at 679.
107. Id. at 681.
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had enlarged a lawfully seized photograph in order to examine [it] in
greater detail.”108
VanLaarhoven invoked Petrone for the unsurprising proposition
that examination of evidence—any evidence, biological or otherwise—
seized pursuant to a warrant does not require secondary judicial authorization.109 However, the court in VanLaarhoven failed to take account of
the fact that undeveloped photo negatives and the contents of an individual’s blood implicate vastly different privacy concerns. The functional
result of its holding was to create an equivalency between biological evidence and tangible, physical evidence that leaves little room for nuanced
analysis where it is most needed.
The following concerns raised by the State of Washington before
the Court of Appeals in Martines also illustrate the same unwillingness
to confront the unique characteristics of a defendant’s blood:
If judicial authorization is required to test blood for alcohol or
drugs, even once that blood is lawfully in police custody, there is
no principled reason to conclude it would not be needed for a
host of other forensic testing as well: to test controlled substances seized from a car during an inventory search; to test[-]fire a
handgun to determine its operability or to determine whether
bullet casings at the scene of a shooting were fired from the same
gun . . . ; to analyze fingerprints left at a crime scene . . . ; [or] to
translate writings from a foreign language into English . . . .110
Implicit in this reasoning is the fear that, taken to its purportedly logical
conclusion, the testing-as-search paradigm would emasculate the efficiency of law enforcement practices.111 But, contrary to the State’s assertion, there is indeed a “principled reason” against extending this approach to nonbiological evidence. Simply put, there is only so much investigative information that can be gleaned from test-firing a handgun,
analyzing fingerprints,112 or translating a piece of writing. Even before
police intervention into his affairs, a criminal suspect would be able to
speculate about the type and extent of information that law enforcement
could gather against him from seizing such evidence. For example, a
suspect who fires a gun in the commission of a felony is likely aware that
the gun might be traced back to him through either fingerprints or ballis108. Id.
109. VanLaarhoven, 637 N.W.2d at 417.
110. Brief of Respondent at 17–18, State v. Martines, 331 P.3d 105 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014)
(No. 69663-7-I), 2010 WL 9592903, at *17–18.
111. See id.
112. In any case, fingerprints fall under the “knowing exposure” exception to the Katz test. See
State v. Martines, 331 P.3d 105, 110–11 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
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tics testing. Yet the investigative inquiry in this particular example is
circumscribed by certain practical limitations: police would not be able
to discern the suspect’s hereditary history or related medical information
from the weapon alone. This is evidently not the case with biological
information, about which a suspect might remain profoundly ignorant
when it comes to the nature and scope of testing that the state might perform, and which the state has far more diverse technological resources to
exploit in doing so.113
A corollary justification for distinguishing between biological and
nonbiological evidence lies in the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
against general warrants.114 Recall that general warrants are inimical with
the Fourth Amendment’s protections because a “general, exploratory
rummaging” of a suspect’s person or property has been held constitutionally impermissible.115 This is precisely the language alluded to by the
Court of Appeals in Martines when it held that “the requirement to obtain a particularized warrant for blood testing will prevent the State from
rummaging among the various items of information contained in a blood
sample for evidence unrelated to drunk driving.”116
By contrast, a Fourth Amendment paradigm of blood testing that
does not recognize the need for express judicial authorization seeks to
legitimize general warrants. This is so because “blood is a substance
whose evidentiary value lies in its components,” and it “has no probative
value in itself.” 117 Instead, “it must be examined for its evidentiary value
to be understood.”118 Acknowledging this reality makes it clear that
blood is more akin to a “place” to be searched than a “thing” to be
seized. No one would contest that a warrant authorizing the search of
John Doe’s home “for evidence of any and all crimes” could not pass
constitutional muster. The same principle holds true here, given that
blood is simply a repository for a myriad of potentially incriminating
evidence sought by the State. An approach that advocates essentially unrestricted testing is therefore compromised by a fatal constitutional infirmity. This concern about general warrants is particularly critical in
light of the fact that “[a]s technology advances, more meaningful information will be extractable from . . . genetic material . . . . [T]he only
practical limit on information that can be extracted from biological sam-

113. See Lowenberg, supra note 101.
114. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); supra text accompanying
notes 1–9.
115. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467; see supra Part I.
116. Martines, 331 P.3d at 111 (emphasis added).
117. Brief of Respondent, supra note 110, at 17.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
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ples are currently-available analysis techniques and our knowledge of
what genetic variations mean.”119
In sum, jurisdictions adopting the testing-as-search paradigm
should proceed as follows: When a magistrate is faced with a petition for
a search warrant attempting to seize biological evidence (such as blood)
from a criminal suspect, the warrant that issues should explicitly incorporate the scope of testing authorized on that sample. To obviate the general warrant problem, such restrictions need to be narrowly tailored in
light of the supporting affidavit of probable cause presented. In the alternative, the State could seek a second warrant after it has collected the
biological evidence in question. Because biological evidence is sui generis, this practice need not be replicated under circumstances when the
object of the warrant is nonbiological.120
For illustrative purposes, consider a relatively straightforward example: John Doe is pulled over for driving erratically late at night. During the encounter, the attending officer notices that Doe’s breath smells
strongly of liquor. A search of his criminal history reveals prior convictions for DUI. When the officer shines her flashlight inside the car, she
notices a small plastic bag of white powder lying in plain view on the
passenger seat. Doe subsequently fails a field sobriety test, and the officer confirms that the plastic bag contains cocaine. If the officer seeks a
warrant for extraction of Doe’s blood, the magistrate should be satisfied
that probable cause exists to authorize extraction of the blood for evidence of driving under the influence. But, on its face, the warrant should
also be narrowly tailored to specifically permit testing only for blood
alcohol and cocaine. Chemical analysis outside these boundaries (such as
for marijuana or any other intoxicant police may wish to find) should be
strictly prohibited.
I would stress that, as a policy matter, there is effectively no reason
for law enforcement officials to seek a separate warrant authorizing testing distinct from the warrant authorizing procurement of the sample. The
two mandates can—and should—be incorporated in the same document.
This is the better practice, at least in theory, because it avoids compounding administrative burdens; as the Supreme Court observed in a recent
case, “[w]arrants inevitably take some time for police officers or prosecutors to complete and for magistrate judges to review.”121 Accordingly,
119. Lowenberg, supra note 101, at 1311.
120. I argue in favor of an important qualification, however, when the state seizes evidence and
subsequently discovers that it has biological evidence in its possession—such as when a weapon is
found to have blood on it. In that situation, I would argue that a separate search warrant is necessary
to restrict the scope of testing on that biological evidence.
121. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1562 (2013).
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the State should not complain of undue delays under the testing-as-search
paradigm, unless it determines that it needs to analyze a biological sample for a different purpose than originally contemplated. Under those circumstances, a second warrant supported by sufficient probable cause
would indeed be necessary.
In the following section, I provide an imperative for the testing-assearch paradigm by offering some speculation as to the privacy interests
we stand to undermine by failing to adopt changes in nationwide search
and seizure jurisprudence with regard to testing of biological samples.
VI. DNA DATABANKS AND RELATED PRIVACY CONCERNS
The need for restrictions on the testing of a defendant’s blood carries particular importance in the realm of DNA databanks.
DNA analysis has been hailed as “one of the most important advances in forensic science.”122 Because the presence of genetic markers
on certain chromosomes is highly unique, DNA testing allows police to
reliably compare the genetic profile of a known person with a genetic
profile left at a crime scene by an unknown individual.123 DNA can be
derived from a wide variety of bodily sources, including blood, saliva,
semen, or shed skin cells.124 Moreover, forensic technology has advanced
such that “[o]nly a miniscule amount of biological material is needed to
produce [a] DNA profile.”125
A DNA databank is a storehouse of genetic records that law enforcement agencies use for criminal identification purposes.126 Every
state in the union has “passed statutes requiring convicted offenders to
provide DNA samples for inclusion in a national database of identifying
profiles.”127 That national databank of genetic profiles is known as the
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) and is overseen by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.128 CODIS is subdivided into local, state, and
national levels; after a profile enters the database at the local level, it then
becomes accessible by state and nationwide searches.129 The CODIS
databank contained more than 11,628,300 profiles as of September
122. Stephen Mercer & Jessica Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The Underregulated World of State
and Local DNA Databases, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 639, 643 (2014).
123. Id. at 643–44.
124. Id. at 643.
125. Id.
126. Bonnie L. Taylor, Comment, Storing DNA Samples of Non-Convicted Persons & the
Debate over DNA Database Expansion, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 509, 513 (2003).
127. Paul M. Monteleoni, Note, DNA Databases, Universality, and the Fourth Amendment, 82
N.Y.U. L. REV. 247, 247 (2007).
128. Catherine W. Kimel, Note, DNA Profiles, Computer Searches, and the Fourth Amendment, 62 DUKE L.J. 933, 938 (2013).
129. Id.
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2012.130 A complete match between a genetic profile in CODIS and an
unknown DNA sample points to the individual associated with the
CODIS profile.131 Meanwhile, a partial match “may identify a family
member as the source of crime scene DNA because related persons inherit their DNA profiles from the same family tree.”132
Even where an individual is never prosecuted or convicted of a
crime, a significant number of states now have statutory schemes authorizing the warrantless DNA sampling of certain arrestees.133 The constitutionality of such laws has been vigorously debated, and a discussion on
the merits is outside the scope of this Note.134
However, at the nexus of biological evidence testing and the proliferation of DNA databanks, there are at least three important privacy concerns that warrant brief scholarly inquiry. In raising these issues, I am
primarily concerned with the State’s extraction of a DNA profile pursuant to a warrant that does not restrict the type of testing that may be performed on a blood sample.
First, and perhaps most obviously, “[i]f a person’s genetic identification profile is created, that person can be implicated in future crimes
and will constantly be compared to crime scene DNA samples, which
some have referred to as lifelong ‘genetic surveillance.’”135 As some
commentators have pointed out, federal courts have yet to specifically
address the issue of whether any subsequent use of DNA profiles constitutes an unreasonable search or violates an individual’s right to “informational privacy.”136 Nevertheless, it is easy to envisage the Fourth
Amendment difficulties posed by a scenario in which a drunk driving
suspect has blood drawn pursuant to a generalized warrant, the State extracts his DNA profile, and that profile subsequently incriminates him in
a far more serious offense such as a homicide.
Second, if DNA is subject to familial searching, to reveal other
family relationships, the individual may feel responsible for subjecting
his entire family to such genetic surveillance.137 Furthermore, “if a family
member were to be subsequently prosecuted for a crime, that individual
could feel responsible for implicating their family member.”138 Discon130. Id.
131. Mercer & Gabel, supra note 122, at 644.
132. Id.
133. Lowenberg, supra note 101, at 1298.
134. See generally Taylor, supra note 126.
135. Lowenberg, supra note 101, at 1317.
136. Taylor, supra note 126, at 523.
137. Lowenberg, supra note 101, at 1317; see also Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial
Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 347 (2010).
138. Lowenberg, supra note 101, at 1317.
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certingly, relatives of the initial suspect might “find themselves eligible
for the database based on nothing more than their relationship to a convicted offender.”139
Finally, information about paternity could be used as evidence of
statutory rape if the mother of the child is underage or as evidence in a
civil case to require the father to pay child support.140 In addition, “government-conducted paternity testing could harm the mother if it keeps a
man involved in her life whom she had hoped to avoid.”141 These issues
could cause further familial disturbances to which—at present—
magistrates give virtually no deference when they issue warrants for the
seizure of biological evidence without restricting its testing.142
To concretize some of the privacy concerns discussed above, consider the following hypotheticals. Although it must be conceded that they
exist merely within the realm of the possible rather than the probable,
these examples are nonetheless informed by the current state of the law.
Assume that each takes place in a jurisdiction, such as Washington,
where DNA extraction is not mandated by statute upon a defendant’s
arrest.143
A. Hypothetical #1
The Gotham Police Department is investigating the grisly double
murder of two women found shot to death in a hotel on the outskirts of
town. Initially, there are few promising leads. However, the forensics
team eventually manages to create two distinct genetic profiles from
hairs discovered on the women’s bodies and on the linens of the beds in
hotel room.
One of the DNA profiles is a direct match to John Doe, a suburban
man who had been arrested for drunk driving twelve years earlier after
police suspected he was responsible for a multicar collision. At that time,
police obtained a warrant to extract Doe’s blood and subsequently analyzed it for its alcohol content, which was technically over the legal limit.
Pursuant to common practice, the police also created a DNA profile and
added it to the state databank. Doe contested the DUI charge and was
acquitted after his lawyer persuaded the jury that the forensic machinery
had not been properly calibrated prior to testing and was thus unreliable.
139. Murphy, supra note 137, at 326.
140. Lowenberg, supra note 101, at 1317.
141. Id. at 1317–18.
142. Indeed, rather than deferring to such concerns, “[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983).
143. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754(1) (2015).
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The other DNA profile yields no positive identification. However,
technicians are able to inform police detectives that the profile is that of a
male individual who bears a familial relation to John Doe—possibly his
brother.
With this information in hand, police call Doe in for questioning
and press him for answers about his involvement. Doe admits that he and
his brother, Mark, had been out celebrating a recent promotion at his real
estate firm on the night of the murders. At some point in the evening,
when the pair were heavily inebriated and strolling along the waterfront,
they were approached by the victims, who intimated that they were
“working girls” and offered their services. On a whim, John and Mark
followed them back to their hotel, but ultimately decided against doing
anything and promptly left a few minutes after arriving. (Assume this
account is factually correct.)
Detectives are unconvinced. Considering the physical evidence far
too inculpatory, John and Mark are both arrested and charged with murder. The jury convicts John, partly on the basis of his statement to police.
Mark is acquitted, but his marriage and family life are destroyed beyond
repair. Because of the publicity from the trial, he is no longer able to find
gainful employment and is ostracized from his community.
B. Hypothetical #2
The electoral race for Gotham City Attorney is one of the most hotly contested in recent memory. The incumbent, John Doe, is fending off
constant criticism in the media by his opponent, Mark Roe. The latest
polls have City Attorney Doe trailing by a significant margin.
Doe has been contemplating capitalizing on rumors that Roe fathered a child with a mistress some years ago. He has avoided leaking the
topic to the media because he knows it would be considered a desperate
ploy if he could not substantiate the allegation.
Late one night, Doe receives a phone call at home informing him
that Roe has been arrested for drunk driving. After police obtain a warrant for Roe’s blood, Doe directs that a DNA profile for Roe be created
as well. Before the blood can be tested for its alcohol content—but after
the DNA profile is extracted—the sample is inadvertently contaminated
and rendered useless. No charges are filed against Roe for the drunk
driving incident.
However, Doe’s campaign hires a private investigator to surreptitiously obtain a discarded straw containing trace saliva from the girl they
suspect to be Roe’s daughter. Further DNA comparison reveals that the
girl is indeed related to Roe. After the sensational story is leaked to the
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press, Roe is utterly discredited as a “family values” politician. Doe narrowly avoids defeat and is re-elected.
CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to elaborate a testing-as-search paradigm
under which the testing of biological evidence qualifies as a distinct
Fourth Amendment event apart from its initial seizure. In doing so, I
have proffered several justifications rooted in existing Supreme Court
precedent, even though such arguments appear inconsistent with national
trends in search and seizure jurisprudence.144
Nonetheless, I have submitted that the sui generis nature of biological evidence, coupled with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
general warrants, counsels in favor of magistrates explicitly restricting
the variety of testing that may be performed on biological evidence in the
same warrant authorizing its seizure. In most respects, this approach does
not require a radical revision of existing privacy case law or principles;
only the acknowledgement that the use of biological evidence poses farther-reaching privacy dilemmas than may have originally been contemplated. The use of nationwide DNA databanks and attendant privacy
concerns provide just one tangible example of the constitutional protections we stand to compromise (and currently are compromising) by failing to adopt the testing-as-search paradigm.

144. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, I have placed principal reliance on Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which is a testament to the continuing legacy of a decision nearly half a century old. See supra Part I. The ensuing decades and future advances in technology will
determine whether Katz remains a constitutional bulwark against privacy intrusions.

